A comprehensive explainer of the ICAAP — what it is, the inputs that feed it, how they flow through to the final capital adequacy assessment, the ECB's SREP response, and the Irish bank context.
The Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) is the bank's own assessment of the capital it needs to cover all material risks — not just the minimum Pillar 1 requirement, but the full risk profile including risks not captured or only partially captured by Pillar 1 models. It is the cornerstone of Pillar 2 under the Basel / CRD framework.
The ICAAP asks the board and management to step back from regulatory formulae and answer a fundamental question: given our specific business model, risk profile, strategy, and the economic environment we operate in — how much capital do we actually need? The answer may be more or less than the Pillar 1 minimum, but must be justified with rigour.
Every CRD-regulated institution must have a robust ICAAP proportionate to its nature, scale and complexity. For ECB-supervised banks (SSM significant institutions), the ICAAP must meet the ECB's specific expectations set out in its ICAAP Guide (2018, updated 2022). The ICAAP is submitted to the ECB annually as a formal supervisory document.
The ECB uses the ICAAP as a primary input to its Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). Based on its assessment of the ICAAP quality and the bank's risk profile, the ECB sets the Pillar 2 Requirement (P2R) and Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) — the binding and non-binding capital add-ons on top of the Pillar 1 minimum. These directly determine the bank's overall capital requirement (OCR) and its distribution capacity.
| Pillar | What It Is | Who Determines It | Capital Output |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pillar 1 | Minimum capital requirements for credit, market, and operational risk — calculated using prescribed regulatory approaches (SA, IRB, FRTB, OpRisk SA) | Prescriptive — determined by regulation. Bank has limited discretion (choice of approach, IRB model parameters) | Minimum CET1 4.5% + AT1 1.5% + T2 2% = 8% total. Plus capital conservation buffer (2.5%) and other systemic buffers |
| Pillar 2 | Additional capital for risks not fully captured by Pillar 1 — IRRBB, concentration risk, CSRBB, pension risk, business and strategic risk, model risk. ICAAP drives the Pillar 2 assessment. | ECB sets P2R (binding) and P2G (non-binding guidance) based on SREP assessment of the bank's ICAAP and risk profile | P2R typically 1–4% CET1 equivalent for Irish pillar banks. P2G an additional buffer recommendation |
| Pillar 3 | Market discipline through public disclosure — banks must publicly disclose their risk profile, capital structure, and capital adequacy metrics to allow market participants to assess them | Prescriptive templates (EBA ITS) plus judgment on additional disclosure | No direct capital requirement — indirect discipline through market reaction to disclosed risk profile |
The ICAAP is not a single calculation — it is a structured process that integrates multiple risk assessments, stress scenarios, and capital projections into a single forward-looking view of capital adequacy. The diagram below shows how the inputs flow through the process to produce the final capital adequacy conclusion.
The ICAAP aggregates capital requirements across all material risks — Pillar 1 risks where regulatory models apply, and Pillar 2 risks where the bank must develop its own quantification methodology. The ECB expects all material risks to be captured, with transparent methodology for each.
Before quantifying capital, the bank must identify all material risks. EBA GL/2016/10 requires banks to conduct a comprehensive risk identification exercise — typically through a combination of the risk taxonomy, loss data, RCSA outputs, and management judgment. Risks must be assessed for materiality; those deemed immaterial must be documented with justification.
| Risk Category | Pillar | Quantification Approach | Capital Source | Irish Bank Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Risk | P1 | IRB (A-IRB or F-IRB) or SA. PD × LGD × EAD formula IRB Explainer | Pillar 1 RWA capital | Largest capital driver — mortgage and SME portfolios dominant |
| Credit Concentration Risk | P2 | Herfindahl index; single-name exposure limits; sector concentration add-ons beyond Pillar 1 model assumptions | Pillar 2 add-on to credit RWA | Irish banks have geographic concentration (Ireland) and sector concentration (residential property) |
| Market Risk (trading) | P1 | FRTB SA or IMA. Sensitivity-based method for interest rate, credit spread, FX, equity CSRBB Explainer | Pillar 1 market risk RWA | Limited for Irish retail banks — mainly IRS for client hedging |
| IRRBB | P2 | EVE and NII sensitivity under 6 standard shocks. Internal model or standardised approach IRRBB Explainer | Pillar 2 — P2R if SOT breached or inadequate management | Very high — tracker mortgages, fixed-rate book growth, deposit repricing |
| CSRBB | P2 | ΔEVE under credit spread shocks. AFS portfolio sensitivity decomposition CSRBB Explainer | Pillar 2 — potential P2R if material OCI risk | AFS bond portfolios — Irish sovereign and covered bond spread risk |
| Operational Risk | P1 | New SA: BIC × ILM. Scenario analysis for tail events OpRisk Explainer | Pillar 1 OpRisk RWA | Tracker mortgage remediation in 10-year loss history elevates ILM |
| Conduct Risk | P2 | Scenario analysis — potential future remediation, regulatory fines, litigation. Expert elicitation. May overlap with OpRisk Cat 4. | Pillar 2 add-on where ongoing conduct exposure is identified | Ongoing regulatory examination exposure; consumer protection |
| Pension Risk | P2 | DB pension deficit sensitivity to discount rate, inflation, longevity. Stress: discount rate +/−100bps, inflation +50bps, longevity +2 years | Pillar 2 — capital required to cover stressed pension deficit not already in equity | AIB and BOI have material defined benefit pension schemes |
| Business & Strategic Risk | P2 | Stressed revenue projections — impact of business model disruption, competitive pressure, revenue decline on earnings and retained capital | Pillar 2 — implicitly captured in stressed capital projections | Fintech competition; Ulster Bank exit; mortgage market structural change |
| Model Risk | P2 | Margins of conservatism on IRB models; validation finding adjustments; model sensitivity to parameter uncertainty | Pillar 2 — add-on where model uncertainty is material | TRIM findings required significant MoC uplifts at Irish banks |
| Macroprudential / Systemic | P2+buffers | O-SII buffer (Other Systemically Important Institution) set by CBI/ECB. Countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) set by CBI | Capital buffer requirement — above OCR, not P2R | Both AIB and BOI designated as O-SII; CCyB currently 1.5% in Ireland |
Where a well-established methodology exists — IRRBB EVE sensitivity, pension deficit stress, concentration Herfindahl — capital is calculated using a defined formula applied to the bank's own data. Transparent and auditable but may not capture tail risks well.
For risks without a standard formula — conduct risk, strategic risk, model risk — capital is estimated using stressed scenarios. Expert judgment calibrates the severity; the difference between the base and stressed capital position provides the P2 capital estimate. OpRisk — Scenario Analysis
Where risk cannot be reliably quantified, banks may assign a notional allocation based on materiality assessment and comparator analysis — or document why the risk is immaterial. The ECB will challenge thin quantification; all P2 capital must be substantiated.
Stress testing is the analytical engine of the ICAAP. It projects how the bank's capital position evolves under adverse conditions — testing whether it can remain above its capital requirements even in severe but plausible scenarios. The ECB places significant weight on stress test credibility, severity, and management actions.
The bank designs its own stress scenarios based on its specific risk profile and vulnerabilities. A good internal scenario is bank-specific — it stresses the factors most relevant to the bank's actual business model rather than generic macro shocks. For an Irish bank, a bank-specific severe scenario might combine a 30% house price fall, ECB rate cut to zero, and a major IT outage simultaneously.
Internal scenarios must be reviewed by the risk function and approved by the Board Risk Committee. The ECB expects them to be genuinely severe — not calibrated to produce comfortable outcomes.
The EBA runs a system-wide stress test every two years applying a common adverse scenario to all significant institutions. Results are published; banks that perform poorly face increased supervisory scrutiny and potential P2G uplift in the subsequent SREP. The 2023 EBA stress test applied a severe adverse scenario including GDP −6%, house prices −21%, and commercial property −26%.
Supervisory stress test results feed directly into the ECB's SREP calibration — particularly for P2G, which is primarily driven by the capital depletion in the adverse scenario.
The stress test begins with the bank's current balance sheet — RWA, capital ratios, P&L run-rate, and risk exposures by portfolio. This is the "Day 1" position from which all projections are made.
The macro scenario (GDP path, unemployment, house prices, interest rates, credit spreads) is applied to the balance sheet through a series of satellite models — each translating macro variables into financial impacts. PiT PD curves rise under adverse macro, driving higher ECL provisions and IRB capital. NII changes with rate paths. CSRBB losses flow through OCI. IFRS 9 — Macro Overlays
Higher PDs under the adverse scenario produce higher IFRS 9 ECL provisions — a direct P&L charge reducing retained earnings. NII may fall (ECB rate cut scenario) or remain elevated (rate spike scenario). Operational risk losses may increase. The net result is typically a significant reduction in pre-provision profit and a large increase in impairment charges.
As PDs rise under the stress, IRB RWA increases — even before any defaults occur, because risk weights are PD-sensitive. This "RWA inflation" is a double-hit: capital falls (through provisions) and the denominator of the capital ratio also rises, compressing the ratio more than either effect alone would suggest.
The year-by-year capital ratio is projected — typically over a 3-year horizon. The minimum capital ratio across the stress horizon is the "stressed CET1 trough". The P2G is calibrated so the bank's CET1 buffer above OCR remains positive even at the stressed trough.
Banks may include management actions in the stress — measures that would be taken in response to stress, such as dividend suspension, balance sheet reduction, or capital raising. The ECB scrutinises management actions carefully — they must be credible, timely, and within the bank's actual capacity to execute. Aggressive or unrealistic management actions are challenged and removed.
The ICAAP's capital adequacy conclusion compares available capital (what the bank actually holds) against required capital (the sum of all Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 requirements plus buffers). The gap between them — the capital headroom — determines the bank's distribution capacity and strategic flexibility.
Each layer of the capital requirement must be met by the appropriate quality of capital. The stack builds from the lowest (most permanent) capital upward.
* Indicative figures for illustrative purposes. P2R is bank-specific and confidential. CCyB = Irish rate as at 2024.
The Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) is the ECB's annual assessment of each significant institution. It consumes the ICAAP as its primary input and produces the P2R and P2G — the Pillar 2 capital add-ons that determine the bank's overall capital requirement for the coming year.
The ECB's SREP assesses four elements, each scored on a 1–4 scale (1 = no material concerns; 4 = high risk / critical concerns). The aggregate SREP score drives the overall supervisory stance and P2R calibration.
Assessment of the viability and sustainability of the business model — can the bank generate adequate returns to sustain its capital base? Considers competitive position, revenue diversification, cost efficiency (CIR), and strategic plan credibility. A bank with a structurally loss-making business model receives a high score (worse) regardless of its current capital position.
Assessment of governance quality — board effectiveness, three lines of defence, risk culture, ICAAP and ILAAP quality. A weak ICAAP — thin quantification, inadequate stress testing, poor documentation, or failure to capture material risks — directly feeds into a higher SREP score and therefore a higher P2R. This is why ICAAP quality investment has a direct capital benefit.
Assessment of capital adequacy under both normal and stressed conditions. Draws directly on the ICAAP — the ECB compares its own assessment of required capital against the bank's ICAAP conclusion. Where the ECB's view of required capital exceeds the bank's own assessment, the gap drives P2R upward. Stress test results (EBA adverse scenario) primarily drive P2G calibration.
Assessment of liquidity adequacy — based on the ILAAP. Considers LCR, NSFR, survival horizon under stress, and funding structure stability. Liquidity findings may generate Pillar 2 liquidity add-ons (specific liquidity requirements) rather than capital charges, though severe liquidity vulnerabilities can indirectly increase P2R capital requirements.
The P2R is a binding, institution-specific capital requirement set by the ECB in the SREP decision. It is confidential — not published — but the total OCR (which embeds P2R) can be inferred from distribution restrictions and public statements.
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Binding? | Yes — binding from the date of the SREP decision letter. Breach triggers automatic MDA restrictions and potential supervisory measures. |
| Capital composition | At least 56.25% of P2R must be met by CET1; at least 75% by Tier 1 capital. The remaining 25% can be Tier 2. This is the CRD V composition rule (the "Danish compromise" extension). |
| What drives P2R? | SREP element scores; ICAAP quality; specific risk quantifications (IRRBB, concentration, pension); EBA stress test results; qualitative risk assessment for risks without standard methodologies. |
| Typical range (Irish banks) | Approximately 2.0–3.5% of RWA for the Irish pillar banks — reflecting material IRRBB, conduct risk legacy, and concentration in Irish property markets. Specific figures are confidential. |
| Can it change? | Yes — the ECB resets P2R annually in the SREP. A bank that significantly improves its ICAAP quality, reduces IRRBB sensitivity, or resolves major conduct exposures can see P2R reduced. Deterioration in risk profile increases it. |
The ECB places as much weight on ICAAP governance as on ICAAP quantification. A technically sophisticated capital model embedded in a governance framework where the board does not meaningfully engage with the output will receive a poor SREP score. The "use test" — evidence that the ICAAP genuinely informs decision-making — is a core ECB expectation.
| Body | ICAAP Responsibility | Minimum Standard |
|---|---|---|
| Board of Directors | Approve the ICAAP document and key assumptions; approve the risk appetite; confirm capital adequacy conclusion; challenge stress test scenarios; sign-off on submission to ECB | Board must actively engage — not rubber-stamp. ECB inspectors interview non-executive directors to test genuine understanding. Risk committee deep-dive mandatory. |
| Board Risk Committee | Review and challenge ICAAP methodology; review risk quantification for each material risk; assess stress test design and results; recommend ICAAP approval to the full board | At least two sessions per year dedicated to ICAAP review. Minutes must show substantive challenge, not just approval. |
| CEO / CFO / CRO | CEO and CFO accountable for business model and strategic plan inputs. CRO responsible for risk identification and quantification. All three sign the ICAAP attestation letter to the ECB. | Management attestation is a formal supervisory requirement — personal accountability for ICAAP quality is explicit under CBI IAF / SEAR. |
| Risk & Finance Functions | Build and maintain ICAAP infrastructure — models, data, scenarios, capital projections. Provide independent risk quantification. Challenge business assumptions in capital projections. | ICAAP team must have adequate resources and seniority. The ECB specifically assesses whether the ICAAP has sufficient investment — underfunded ICAAP teams are a governance finding. |
| Month | Activity | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Jan–Feb | SREP decision letter received for prior year. P2R and P2G confirmed. Qualitative requirements noted. New ICAAP cycle planning begins. | CRO / CFO; Board Risk Committee informed |
| Mar–Apr | Risk identification and materiality assessment updated. Business plan / strategic plan confirmed for stress test base scenario. Macro scenarios designed and approved. | Risk function; Strategy / Finance; ORCC |
| May–Jul | Pillar 1 RWA projections updated. Pillar 2 risk quantifications refreshed (IRRBB, CSRBB, pension, concentration). Stress tests run under all scenarios. | Risk function; Capital management; Treasury |
| Aug–Sep | ICAAP document drafted. Internal validation / peer review. Capital adequacy conclusion drafted. Management actions documented where applicable. | Capital team; second-line validation; Legal |
| Oct | Board Risk Committee review and challenge. Board approval. Management attestation letters signed. | Board; CEO; CFO; CRO |
| Nov | ICAAP submitted to ECB Joint Supervisory Team. Accompanying letter from CEO/CRO/CFO. | CRO; JST relationship management |
| Dec–Jan | ECB review and dialogue. Requests for clarification or supplementary analysis. SREP preparation begins. Cycle recommences. | CRO; ECB JST |
An illustrative ICAAP capital adequacy assessment for a hypothetical large Irish retail bank — showing how Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 risk quantifications aggregate to an internal capital requirement, how stress testing identifies the capital buffer needed, and how the SREP conclusion compares.
| Component | RWA | P1 Min (8%) | CET1 Required (4.5%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Risk (A-IRB + output floor) | €27.0bn | €2,160m | €1,215m |
| Market Risk (FRTB SA) | €2.0bn | €160m | €90m |
| Operational Risk (New SA) | €6.0bn | €480m | €270m |
| Total Pillar 1 | €35.0bn | €2,800m | €1,575m (4.50%) |
| Pillar 2 Risk | Capital Required (€m) | % of RWA | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|
| IRRBB — EVE sensitivity | 420 | 1.20% | Parallel up scenario ΔEVE = −€1,050m; 40% capitalised IRRBB Explainer |
| Credit concentration risk | 280 | 0.80% | Irish property concentration add-on (Herfindahl approach); single-name excess |
| CSRBB — AFS portfolio | 175 | 0.50% | +150bps spread shock on €5bn AFS portfolio; duration 4.5yr → €337m; 52% capitalised CSRBB Explainer |
| Operational risk (P2 add-on) | 105 | 0.30% | Conduct risk scenario (future remediation probability); cyber tail scenario |
| Pension risk | 140 | 0.40% | Stressed DB deficit: −100bps discount rate shock → €350m deficit increase; 40% not offset by P&L hedges |
| Model risk | 105 | 0.30% | Margin of conservatism on IRB PD models; 5% uplift to credit RWA × 8% capital ratio |
| Business & strategic risk | 70 | 0.20% | Revenue stress under competitive scenario; structural NII decline |
| Total Pillar 2 | 1,295 | 3.70% | Sum of all Pillar 2 quantifications |
| Scenario | CET1 Trough (3yr) | vs. OCR (binding) | vs. OCR + P2G | Conclusion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | 14.6% → 15.2% | +2.8% | +1.3% | Comfortable — capital builds through retained earnings |
| Adverse (GDP −2%, HPI −15%) | 14.6% → 12.1% | +0.3% | −1.2% | Below P2G at trough — ECB expects P2G headroom; focus of SREP dialogue |
| Severe adverse (GDP −5%, HPI −30%) | 14.6% → 9.8% | −2.0% | −3.5% | Breach of OCR at trough — management actions required (dividend suspension + portfolio disposal) |
The ICAAP has taken on greater importance for Irish banks following the post-crisis period — the ECB's increased supervisory intensity through TRIM, targeted model reviews, and deep SREP dialogue has raised the standard required of Irish bank ICAAPas significantly since 2015.
Irish banks have extreme geographic and sector concentration — predominantly lending to Irish borrowers secured on Irish property. The Pillar 1 IRB model assumes a diversified portfolio; Irish banks must hold a material Pillar 2 concentration add-on to reflect that actual losses in a severe Irish property downturn (2008–2012: −55% peak-to-trough for residential, worse for commercial) would far exceed the diversified loss assumption embedded in the ASRF formula underlying IRB capital. IRB Explainer — Capital Formula
The tracker mortgage book creates a distinctive IRRBB profile that requires careful ICAAP treatment — the EVE impact (negative under rate rises due to long fixed-rate mortgage book) and the NII impact (positive under rate rises due to tracker book) pull in opposite directions. Quantifying the net capital requirement requires full cashflow modelling across decades of remaining mortgage maturities, with careful treatment of the contractual floor on tracker rates at ECB MRR + margin. IRRBB Explainer
The tracker mortgage scandal, PPI mis-selling, and ongoing CBI examination activity mean Irish banks must hold Pillar 2 capital for forward-looking conduct risk — the probability of future remediation programmes or regulatory fines from exposures not yet identified. Quantifying this is highly judgmental; scenario analysis based on the quantum and trajectory of current examination activity is the primary methodology. The ECB has focused on ensuring Irish banks' conduct risk P2 capital is not systematically underestimated. OpRisk Explainer — Loss Categories
The CRR III output floor phases in between 2025 and 2030 — progressively increasing Pillar 1 credit RWA for Irish mortgage books where A-IRB models produce risk weights well below the SA floor. The ICAAP must model the multi-year RWA trajectory as the floor ratchets up, project the capital implications, and demonstrate the bank's capital plan absorbs the headwind without breaching OCR. AIB and BOI have publicly quantified this as a several-billion-euro RWA headwind phasing over five years. IRB Explainer — Output Floor
| Area | ECB Expectation (2018 Guide) | Evolution to Present |
|---|---|---|
| Proportionality | ICAAP must be proportionate to bank's nature, scale, complexity | ECB has raised expectations for all SSM banks — even smaller SIs face more granular ICAAP requirements. The ECB has signalled that "simple" ICAAPsare no longer acceptable for banks with material Pillar 2 risks. |
| Stress severity | Stress scenarios must be severe but plausible | Post-COVID and post-2022 rate cycle, the ECB expects stress scenarios calibrated to recent observed stress — scenarios that do not include a 2022-style rate shock are now considered insufficiently severe for Irish banks. |
| IRRBB / CSRBB integration | IRRBB capital must be quantified and reflected in P2R discussion | CRR III Art. 84 now explicitly requires CSRBB to be separately identified and reported. ECB expects IRRBB and CSRBB to be separately decomposed in the ICAAP rather than reported as a combined sensitivity. |
| Capital distribution governance | ICAAP should inform distribution decisions | ECB now explicitly links ICAAP stress test results to distribution capacity. Banks are expected to model MDA trigger proximity under adverse scenarios before confirming dividend or buyback programmes. |
| Climate risk | Not explicitly required in 2018 Guide | ECB now expects climate risk to be integrated into the ICAAP — both transition risk (carbon price scenarios) and physical risk (flood, heat stress on collateral). Irish banks face physical risk through collateral exposed to coastal flooding and transition risk through energy-inefficient mortgage portfolios. |
AIB's ICAAP is dominated by the interaction between its large tracker book (IRRBB), its AFS sovereign portfolio (CSRBB), the output floor transition on its mortgage book (Pillar 1 headwind), and legacy conduct risk from the tracker examination. AIB discloses its OCR and CET1 headroom explicitly and calibrates dividends and buybacks against P2G proximity — demonstrating the direct use test link between ICAAP outputs and distribution decisions.
BOI's ICAAP spans two regulatory jurisdictions (ECB/SSM and PRA) — a complexity that requires consolidated and solo ICAAPs running in parallel with different stress scenarios. The PRA's concurrent stress test (UK equivalent of EBA stress test) and the ECB's SREP may produce different P2G conclusions, requiring a consolidated view of the binding constraint. BOI's UK mortgage book adds cross-currency IRRBB and CSRBB that must be separately modelled and aggregated.
PTSB's ICAAP is focused on managing a rapid balance sheet transformation — the 2023 Ulster Bank acquisition materially changed PTSB's risk profile, requiring a significant ICAAP refresh. Integration risk (Pillar 2 operational), the inherited mortgage portfolio characteristics, and the tracker book concentration are the dominant themes. PTSB's smaller capital base makes P2G headroom management proportionally more complex — a 1% P2G is a larger relative constraint for PTSB than for its larger peers.
Interactive scenario analysis based on AIB Group's FY 2025 actual balance sheet. Adjust the macro and balance sheet parameters to see how NII, ECL provisions, CET1 ratio, and overall capital headroom respond. This is a simplified but structurally accurate model — the same type of analysis that feeds an ICAAP stress test.
| Parameter | AIB Disclosed Sensitivity | Direction | Modelled Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|
| ECB rate −100bps | −€378m NII | Negative — tracker book reprices down immediately; partially offset by deposit cost relief | Tracker (€10.5bn × −1%) + partial variable + CBI deposit (€48.5bn × −0.85%) − deposit savings (€117bn × 20% beta × −1%) |
| Deposit beta 20% | Base assumption | Each 10pp increase in beta costs ~€117m additional NII per 100bps of ECB move | Higher beta = more deposit cost passed to customers; critical for NII in rate-cut environment |
| Loan growth +1% | ~+€30m NII | Positive — new loans at current market rates (~4.5% approx.) generate incremental interest income | €72bn × 1% growth × 4.5% yield × (1-tax) = after-tax retained earnings add to CET1 |
| House prices −10% | Indirect via ECL | Negative — worsens LGD on €37bn+ Irish mortgage book; stage migrations increase ECL provisions | HPI drives LGD in IFRS 9 downside scenario; also affects IRB RWA indirectly over time |
| Credit spread +100bps on AFS | ~−€970m OCI | Negative direct CET1 hit — €21.5bn × 4.5yr duration × 1% ≈ €970m unrealised OCI loss | AFS bonds FVOCI — spread widening flows directly to AOCI and reduces CET1 without P&L |
| GDP −1pp below base | ~+€80–120m ECL | Negative — lower GDP increases macro PiT PD estimates across all portfolios | IFRS 9 macro overlay: scenario weights shift toward downside; PiT PD rises; stage migrations increase |
The ICAAP is assembled from data flowing through a chain of models and processing steps — each with defined inputs, transformations, and outputs. Click any stage below to explore its inputs, models/processing steps, and outputs in detail.